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VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS V. SKYJACK DETERRENCE:
AN AIRLINE MAN'S VIEW
MICHAEL J. FENELLOt
0 N A SPRING NIGHT in 1937 near Frankfurt, Germany, a
small group of passengers boarded the giant airship Hindenberg
for what was to be its fatal flight to Lakehurst, New Jersey. Each
passenger was subjected to an extremely intensive search. Ostensibly,
the purpose was to prevent carriage of any items, such as cigarette
lighters and photo flashbulbs, which could ignite the dirigible's vola-
tile hydrogen. However, the Hindenberg had also been the object
of numerous bomb threats,' and the presence of Gestapo agents on the
scene would make one wonder whether safety of the airship was the
only consideration for the search.
In 1937, and in the years that followed, the searching of air
travelers became a routine aspect of German life. William Shirer, in
his best selling book "Berlin Diary," expressed outrage at the forced
disrobing and bodily search of his wife prior to boarding a commercial
airliner.' At the time, Americans considered this as typical only of the
evil Nazi regime. It seemed terrible to us, who, fortunately, had the
fourth amendment to prevent such degrading practices.'
It seems ironic that 35 years later, we find ourselves in a situation
where each and every air traveler in the United States is treated as
a criminal suspect as soon as he enters an airline terminal.4 It would
seem strange to the citizen of 1937 that air travelers today not only
submit willingly to searches of their person and carry-on baggage,
but actually laud the virtues of and need for such action.
It is indeed fortunate that public concern about the threat of
skyjacking has brought widespread initial support of the restrictive
measures presently in use. The major questions now are: (1) how
long will this public support prevail, and (2) how long can we con-
tinue this procedure, either as a practical measure, or in face of the
legal challenges it will generate.
t Vice President, Eastern Airlines, Inc.
1. A. HOEHLING, WHO DESTROYED THE HINDENBERG 26 (1962).
2. W. SHIRER, BERLIN DIARY 91 (1961).
3. "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated .... " U.S.
CONST. amend. IV.
4. See Emergency Order of FAA, U.S. Dep't of Transp. Press Release No.
103-72 (Dec. 5, 1972).
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Both of these considerations were of paramount concern to
Eastern Airlines when it first embarked on a hijack deterrent program
in early 1969. It may be recalled that our airline was a favorite
among Cuba-bound individuals at that time, reaching a peak frequency
of about one diverted flight a week.
When we sat down with a team of operations authorities and
psychologists at the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), we
developed a deterrent system that proved to be quite effective. It
involved three essential ingredients: (1) a behavioral profile to isolate
suspicious individuals, or "selectees," 5 (2) a magnetometer to disclose
the presence of metal common to weapons; and (3) a federal marshal
to conduct searches and arrests.' Most importantly, this system could
function with a minimum of interference to innocent travelers, while
at the same time have the blessing of the courts.7 It has been held
that application of the behavioral profile in conjunction with the
magnetometer is sufficient to establish a legal cause for detainment
and limited search of the selectee.8
There was a fourth ingredient, perhaps an ancillary one, which
we considered important to the success of the program. I speak of an
openness with the news media. It was agreed that if a maximum
deterrent effect was to be achieved, potential skyjackers should know
that we were establishing a screen to snare them. In addition, public
knowledge of all aspects, except details of the behavioral profile, would
hopefully assure our regular customers that we were seriously trying
to stop skyjackings.
Initially, the newspaper, radio, and television coverage given our
program was most beneficial. However, there were other times when
it came to be a handicap of major proportions. Not only did the
media, perhaps unwittingly, give major attention to clandestine actions
aimed at apprehending skyjackers, but they even began to play childish
games. For example, there were numerous incidents where television
crews tried to sneak through our screen, or slink through back doors
in the ramp areas. Yet, on balance, I should say that the media has
been of true assistance in recent months. News of the hijacker prose-
cutions by the courts is now receiving much more prominent attention,
as is the hostile reception being given skyjackers in Cuba and Algeria.9
5. The selectee was the result of a comprehensive profile of skyjackers de-
veloped by Dr. John T. Dailey. For insights into the make-up of the selectee's
profile, see Dailey, Development of a Behavioral Profile for Air Pirates, 18 VILL.
L. REv. 1004 (1973).
6. See United States v. Lopez, 328 F. Supp. 1077, 1083 (E.D.N.Y. 1971).
7. Id. at 1084.
8. Id. at 1097.
9. E.g., Washington Post, Feb. 27, 1973, at B15, cols. 6-7.
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The return of ransom money has likewise been widely publicized.
Such news presentations cannot help but discourage any prospective
skyjacker.
In a different vein, we thought from the outset that judges
would render heavy penalties against those skyjackers who were
caught. Instead, until very recently, there have been many instances
in which the minimum penalty was imposed. Unfortunately, there
are still people walking the streets who were apprehended in the act
of skyjacking an aircraft.
For some reason - perhaps the increasingly violent character of
skyjackings - the courts are being much tougher today.'0 The con-
sequent stronger sentences are, in turn, generating broader news
media attention for which we can be thankful.
The problems we had were ancillary, and did not alter our feeling
that we had a system which would work, and which all parties in-
volved would accept.
In the more than 3 years that this system was utilized it with-
stood all constitutional challenges. In turn, we reduced our hijack
frequency among United States airlines from one in three in 1969
to less than 2 in 33 by the end of 1972. Over 1,000 suspicious persons
were denied boarding of our aircraft, an option allowed under the
federal tariffs regulating us," and over 600 others were taken into
custody at our gates on a variety of charges including illegal possession
of firearms, possession of narcotics, and flight to avoid prosecution.
It is significant to point out that Eastern spent more than $2.5
million of its own money in developing this system, mostly for the
purchase of magnetometers and the training of personnel. We organ-
ized a special Hijack Task Force within the airline with members
from each operational department of the company, along with officials
of both our unions and governmental agencies. The job of this task
force was to stay abreast of developments in the screening program
and to evaluate any changes that might make our procedures more
effective. It has been an extremely active, hard-working group.
To be candid, Eastern's zeal in this effort, unfortunately, was
not matched by other members of the airline industry. As a result,
while we achieved a dramatic reduction in the number of hijackings
on our airline, there was less impressive improvement among carriers
as a whole. Worse still, the severity of the incidents rose to a point
10. Judge Craven expressed his concern over the seriousness of the hijacking
crisis and the violent character of the various hijackings in United States v. Epper-
son, 454 F.2d 769, 771-72 (4th Cir. 1972).
11. Federal Aviation Act § 1111, 49 U.S.C. § 1511 (1970).
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where people were killed either in the hijacking process or by law
enforcement personnel attempting to stop the crime.12 All of this
generated a great amount of pressure on the federal agencies, which
were increasingly embarrassed by extremely prominent and detailed
news media accounts of the incidents. It reached the point where the
White House itself felt the heat.'" At Eastern, we were fully con-
scious of the unfortunate path the situation was taking. While we
were steadily trying to maintain and perfect an effective, legal pro-
gram of deterrence, the Government was resorting to measures which
were dramatic, highly visible, and designed more on the basis of
political considerations than practicality.
First, we had the sky marshal program, an unbelievably expensive
project which, while generating mass publicity, did not bring about a
single arrest or stoppage of a hijacking.'" Ultimately, it was dis-
continued.' 5 Then we entered the "get tough" phase, with the federal
agencies determining to stop hijackings once they were underway by
shooting out tires,'" bringing in sharpshooters, and the like. Some
aircraft were stopped, but in some instances passengers or crew
members were killed or wounded.' 7 It was not surprising that public
concern was evolving into sheer terror. To our dismay at Eastern,
the outcry was drowning out our contention that an acceptable solu-
tion was available if only we would "get our act together." In other
words, we needed to implement a nationwide application of the deter-
rent system that had already proven itself effective, and we needed to
force a concentrated drive toward closing skyjacker havens through
international agreements. Regrettably, the hysteria reached a point
where no one was interested in such an approach. In meeting after
meeting, representatives of various nations refused to take any collec-
tive action to close the havens.' 8 They could not even gain unanimity
on the Tokyo or Hague Conventions.19 Before we knew it, the Secre-
tary of Transportation stepped forth with a federal order that is totally
unprecedented in this nation's history.2" For the first time, and this
12. See 37 Fed. Reg. 25934 (1972).
13. Id.
14. See S. REP. No. 93-13, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 10 (1973). While FAA would
contend that arrests were made during this activity, there were no apprehensions
made "in flight", which was the focal point of the sky marshal campaign. It is
contended that those arrests which occurred on the ground would have come about
without the sky marshals.
15. Id. at 11.
16. Washington Post, Feb. 27, 1973, at B15, cols. 6-7.
17. See 37 Fed. Reg. 25934 (1972).
18. S. REP., supra note 14, at 4-5.
19. Id. at 2-4.
20. Emergency Order of FAA, U.S. Dep't of Transp. Press Release No. 103-72
(Dec. 5, 1972).
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includes wartime security measures, we have imposed a mass manda-
tory search on a private segment of our society.2 '
What is happening in the nation's airline terminals today is pre-
cisely what Eastern sought to avoid when designing its deterrent
program in 1969. Today, that program is nonexistent. In its place is
another expensive, highly visible, politically motivated exercise - if
you will permit an operating man to call a spade a spade.
Up to this point, it might appear that I am being critical of the
way things have gone. Before proceeding, let me emphasize that
the hat I wear is grey rather than purely black or white. I question
the strategy and not the mission. Eastern Airlines has demonstrated
its dedication to deterring hijacking. In fact, we were pretty lonely
in that endeavor for quite a long time. So, when we express our
opinion on the subject, we feel that we have justified the right by
experience.
As mentioned earlier, the procedure in effect today is based upon
the premise that each and every air traveler is now a suspect, or as
we've referred to him earlier, a selectee.22 This premise is based upon
no justifiable cause other than the fact that the individual has bought
a ticket for a ride on a commercial airliner. At that point, he appar-
ently surrenders any inalienable right so far as personal privacy is
concerned. He can refuse to be searched, however, in such case, we
have no alternative but to deny him boarding of the aircraft. If we
do let him on, we are subject to a fine of up to $1,000 by the FAA.23
This has happened, for example, in the case of the Honorable Vance
Hartke, Senator from Indiana. Two airlines permitted him to board
after he pleaded special immunity as a member of the Senate and
were subsequently fined.24
Notably, Senator Hartke was the object of fierce public reaction
when news of his actions were publicized. Numerous editorials and
letters-to-the-editor were written condemning him, not only for his
attitude, but also for his endangering the overall antihijack program.25
Indeed, it is this very strong public support of the program that is
currently protecting the airlines and the federal government from a
mass of charges that we are tramping all over the fourth amendment.
21. 14 C.F.R. § 121.538 (1973).
22. See note 5 supra. See also United States v. Lopez, 328 F. Supp. 1077
(E.D.N.Y. 1971).
23. To allow an unscreened individual to board an aircraft would violate the
provisions of 14 C.F.R. § 121.538(h) (1973) which states that "each certificate
holder shall at all times maintain and carry out the [approved] screening system ......
24. Washington Post, Jan. 28, 1973, at A25, cols. 1-3.
25. E.g., Washington Post, Feb. 5, 1973, at A20, col. 5.
[VOL. 18 : p. 9851000
5
Fenello: Individual Rights v. Skyjack Deterrence: An Airline Man's View
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1973
SKYJACKING
To me, as an airline operating official, this aspect of the skyjack-
ing problem has been particularly intriguing. It would appear that
public opinion is the one powerful force in this nation that can over-
ride constitutional protections. One might say that that is fortunate
in view of the extreme measures we have adopted. However, as a
citizen, I am bothered by the thought that this little infringement on
our personal liberties, if accepted, may only serve to inure us to
further infringements - a step by step erosion of our constitutional
rights2" - and, as an airline operating man, I must wonder, how long
we can continue with the present procedure, how long the public will
continue to support us.
It may well be that my concern over punitive action against the
airlines is unnecessary. After all, we are merely complying with an
order from the federal agency which, by congressional act, is charged
with regulating our operations." If there is a dispute, then it is clearly
between the federal government and the offended party.
Frankly, we in airline operations have our hands full simply
tying to stop hijackings. The current procedures, while very dis-
tasteful and exceeding what we at Eastern feel is necessary, have been
of assistance toward that end. But in my opinion, and this opinion
is based on discussions with Eastern's legal counsel, these new pro-
cedures pose real problems to you in the legal profession.
At present, we have abolished all the earlier conditions which
supported reasonable cause for search and detainment.2" We may
have deterred hijackings to a large extent, but we have also seriously
complicated the processes by which we would hope to prosecute those
violators caught in our snare.
Our original antihijack system was upheld under the standard
set forth in Terry v. Ohio. 9 Terry concerned the arrest of an individual
who was acting suspiciously and turned out to be carrying a concealed
pistol. 0 The Court ruled that the policeman's instincts and powers
of observation as an experienced lawman - plus the consideration
of protecting himself and others from possible danger - were suffi-
cient to justify a limited search for weapons. 3'
26. This thought has also been reflected by other commentators. See, e.g., Gora,
The Fourth Amendment at the Airport: Arriving, Departing, or Cancelled?, 18
VILL. L. REV. 1036 (1973).
27. Federal Aviation Act § 101, 49 U.S.C. § 1341 (1970).
28. See generally United States v. Bell, 464 F.2d 667 (2d Cir. 1972); United
States v. Epperson, 454 F.2d 769 (4th Cir. 1972); United States v. Lopez, 328 F.
Supp. 1077 (E.D.N.Y. 1971).
29. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
30. Id. at 6.
31. Id. at 20-27.
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United States v. Lopez32 is the landmark case upholding the
constitutionality of searches conducted under our original antihijack
program. Lopez involved search, confiscation of narcotics, and arrest
after the suspect, a selectee, triggered the magnetometer at an airport . 3
Judge Weinstein upheld the system because of its selectivity, and
cautioned against a program that involves mass searcha 4
It must be understood that the entire situation has changed since
the incident which gave rise to Judge Weinstein's decision. The
mass search is now the order of the day and there is no prior basis
for suspicion. The traveler must, if he wishes to board, submit to
search of both his possessions and person. If it turns out that the
traveler is carrying narcotics or is fleeing to avoid prosecution, it is
not clear whether his arrest can be justified if he were apprehended
pursuant to antihijacking measures. Further, it is not yet known
how a court will decide when faced with an argument that the arrest
was illegal since there was no reason whatever to suspect that sky-
jacking was the individual's intent. In addition, it should be noted
that under the new Government regulations, arrests are now made by
local police instead of the federal marshals used heretofore., 5 In that
case, there may be a question as to which governmental entity - local,
state, or federal - has jurisdiction to prosecute the alleged violation.
All in all, these and other questions represent some interesting new
twists for those of you who have chosen law as your profession.
For myself and others in the airline industry, we are going to
continue with the mission of trying to halt skyjackings. I sincerely
hope we can find a way out of this blind canyon through which we
seem to be flying. It appears that, at the moment, we are faced with
a procedure which will be very difficult to halt or to replace with a
less obstrusive but more effective means of screening passengers and
luggage for weapons. With our old procedures, we could have quietly
and discreetly phased out the security measures if it were eventually
deemed that skyjacking was no longer a menace. But now, we have
thrown up a highly visible, awkward checkpoint, and its discontinua-
tion will seem to announce to every sick mind in the country that it is
once again open season on the airlines and their passengers.
Frankly, there are some benefits to us and others in the present
situation. Our gate agents like the present system because it cuts
down on congestion in airport concourses. Law enforcement people
32. 328 F. Supp. 1077 (E.D.N.Y. 1971).
33. Id. at 1081-82.
34. Id. at 1101-02.
35. 14 C.F.R. §§ 107.1, .4 (1973).
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like it because it gives them a chance to check on literally millions
of people who might be violating something.3 The only ones incon-
venienced are the passengers, or their friends and relatives who want
to greet or see them off at the airport. Yet, as I have said, we have had
no major outpouring of complaints, to date, from that contingent.
Just when, or if, we can discontinue these severe search measures
is a question no one can answer at the moment. We can only wait and
see what the Administration will do.
36. See S. REP., supra note 14, at 9. See also 328 F. Supp. at 1098-99.
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